Interview with Ilhamm Ehmed, head of Excecutive Body of the Syrian Democtatic Council - aridate January 18, 2019

Elham Ahamd (Îlham Ehmed) discusses current politics of Syria's Northeast, the US withdrawal decision, Turkey's threats, and the Syrian Democratic Councils plans and goals.
airdate January 18, 2019

Transcript:

We will discuss the safe zone issue today, that is one.
The other issue is the negotiations with Damascus: What are the developments of the negotiations so far; are there real negotiations? The Russian role; is there dependency on the Russian role? What can the Russians do?
Many questions that we will ask Ilham Ehmed.

The issue of the withdrawal [of American forces from Syria] is still unclear. Even some Americans say that it’s not clear.

– True.
Of course, the one who took this decision, knows what the withdrawal decision means. We tried hard to understand. Especially, the withdrawal is happening while the battle against ISIS is ongoing.
And this decision concurs with the Turkish offensive. I mean Turkey’s threats on the region.

So, we tried hard to understand this decision; why? Why at this moment exactly; in these conditions?

According to conjecture, to what has been said, the withdrawal is done according to the promise that the American President had given his nation during the election campaign: that all forces and combatants would be returned to America.

But that contradicts the reality on the ground.

Therefore, I think that… or what appeared from the statements issued by American officials. Whether they were from the State Department or officials from the White House.

According to analyses, all of them show that there is some kind of shift on the speed of the withdrawal process.
Meaning that the decision hasn’t been reversed, but there was a slowdown, in addition to thinking of alternatives or plans for withdrawing: how it can be done.

Basically, what they say is that the safely of their combatants is paramount, in addition to some other issues, other alternatives.

The vagueness is still there basically; we still see that there is vagueness, and that there isn’t any announced clear plan. But whether this really mean that the American government doesn’t have a plan, we don’t know.

It is possible that they have a plan. For example, the statements that are issued every now and then through the Tweets that the American President writes, show that there is a plan.
But to what extent will [all] other sides be convinced of their plans, is not known.

– There weren’t discussions with you on this issue? Since you are the political umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is a main component of the anti-terror coalition?

– We’ve discussed this issue with them in length.
They promised to support revisiting the issue, and that they would support securing the region.
And that they would contribute in strengthening the existing local administrations, or the local existing councils. That they would help them get on their feet.

– Even after withdrawing?

– This was before the withdrawal decision.

Before the withdrawal decision, there were promises to completely destroy ISIS; to consolidate stability in the region and to revisit the issue.
This is for the first time, in the past years, since the cooperation against ISIS until about 6 to 12 months ago, that their policies become somewhat clear.

But, generally, the political aspect was never clear. Meaning that they focused on fighting terrorism as main priority, and the political strategy wasn't clear. But in the past several months the picture somewhat cleared up. But suddenly this decision to withdraw came out. And that wasn’t in their plans either. Through the debates that appeared between government officials...

– The reactions and resignations...

– Yes, what unfolded from within American government circles, proves that the decision was taken unilaterally.
And it doesn’t necessarily mean that the President has taken the decision alone, but certain institutions, not all the American [government] institutions.

Hence, due to the objections that came out there, the discourse somewhat started. But this decision was not discussed with us before it was put out.
And we discussed that in length with them: how could such a decision be taken… the American government can take its own decisions, but the withdrawal must not lead to chaos after it’s done.

As we have seen, due to the mere revelation of this decision, tumult from numerous powers came: who will fill the vacuum after the coalition?

Many questions like that were asked. “Who will be the powers?”

While the existence…

– Is there a real decision anyhow?

– I want to mention this point especially:

Basically, the coalition forces’ presence in the region is symbolic. Very symbolic; consists of military bases.

But the matter of protection, protecting the border, security and preserving stability, are all on the shoulders of SDF, YPG and the internal security forces. They are the ones taking this responsibility.

But if we consider the political aspect, meaning the fate of the region, who will determine the fate of this region? Knowing that there is an immense tussle about the region. One could say it’s an international tussle.

Thus the voices increased; Turkey, for example, has increased its threats in an obvious way. In addition to the statements by Russia and the regime… numerous statements on the fate of the region and who would take over it after the coalition.

Therefore, the matter of withdrawing should’ve at least had preparatory steps.

And that is what we have told them candidly; that a partnership can’t be as your partnership. A partnership should be unambiguous, honest, and all the desired steps should be planned jointly, not unilaterally.

– But we should also mention the fact that despite the [lack] of the collaboration which you mentioned, they didn’t abandon you.
In all their statements, from Pompeo, to Bolton, to Trump, they were reiterating that.

– I think they were… at least those who took this decision, expected a smooth withdrawal, without any trouble; considering the existence of military and security forces, and administrations. And that even Turkey could play a positive role, as it is a permanent strategic ally to America. But from the Turkish statements, they saw that the opposite is true; meaning that Turkey, basically goes after Kurds specifically.
And goes after the stability and security of the region, and subsequently, all the components of the region.

Therefore, the biggest danger… considering the Turkish statements always come in a certain context: that the Kurds should not remain there, and that the YPG is terrorists.
Meaning the Turkish statements especially have been focused on the Kurdish component.
Therefore the answer came from the American officials: that there must be protection for Kurds, the real partners on the ground; regarding that they gave the greatest sacrifices in the face of terrorism.
Thus, that can be considered a sort of support; we can consider it as such.

– Among the consequences of the withdrawal decision is that you, the Syrian Democratic Council, or the Autonomous Administration, have once again started the negotiations with Damascus.
It was even inferred that you, due to the withdrawal [decision], invited the Syrian army to come to the outskirts of Manbij.

Negotiations with the regime already existed. Several meetings were conducted. But there was some lagging.

As the [withdrawal] decision was taken… before that as well; before the decision was taken, we had a strategic approach regarding dialogue.
Meaning, we believe that the resolution must be Syrian. And that a solution must be sought inside Syria, and with the original interlocutors from inside Syria.

On that basis, we made many attempts. And they were somewhat hindered, but that wasn’t from our side. We weren’t the reason for the hindering.

– Suspension of the dialogue…

– Hindering, one could say; not exactly suspension.

According to what we understood from the talks in that period, the regime still has a project to assert its authority on all regions, without offering any alternatives.
That is of course unacceptable for us; that project is rejected from our side. But that is the only project the regime offers.
Or, the possibility of… they suggested the local administration project and to see how to combine the matter of local administrating with the [legislative] decree number 107. But that is a difficult thing. On the contrary; we think the opposite is possible: that local administration is part of the autonomous administration.

We hoped that Russia would play a role in proceeding the dialogue. In other words, for Russia to play the role of guarantor in the negotiations process.
We noticed that Russia’s response in the past months didn’t match expectations. But as the withdrawal decision came out and the Turkish threats began, I think the Russians realized the danger as well.
If Turkey enters these regions, it means that it will attempt to control all of Syria, not only Northern Syria.

Turkey has a presence in Idlib, which means all of western Euphrates is under its influence. If Turkey enters even a small part of eastern Euphrates, it means that it will not stop and will expand its control on all of Syria. That is the main aim for Turkey.

Even though there are economical ties, and mutual interests between Turkey and Russia, Russia felt the danger despite that.
Hence, Russia started its preparations to play the guarantor role, and we met with them. And we officially asked them to take the responsibility of playing the role of guarantor between us and the Syrian government.
But until now, we haven’t seen practical steps; what we had discussed hasn’t been implemented in practice. And we are still waiting.
So, the request to bring forces to protect the borders, was also a procedure meant to be morphed into a negotiation process. Even though it was a hasty step, as a gradual procedure… we wanted to take gradual procedures. But they would turn into continual steps within a future negotiation process with the regime.

– There are also some who rumours about the negotiations… and some say the Turkish intelligence has a big role in spreading such rumours. There is scaremongering among the Arab components, that you now negotiate as “Kurds,” and once you’ve reached some type of agreement or settlement, you will turn your backs on them and leave them to their fate.
And that makes them suspicious and feel unsecure, so now they seek reconciliation and such.

How do you see this matter?

– True, we have received many messages regarding this matter. And through our blending with the public, we sensed that there are some concerns among our Arab brothers/sisters.
We have started a collaborative project together. Meaning, when we laid the foundation of this project, we didn’t do it alone; as Kurds. I say that as a Kurd, and as a pioneering participant of this project. We didn’t start it alone.
True, the idea came from a certain side, but it evolved…

The idea, of course, underwent changes, evolution, renewing… great changes were done to the idea when it was shared with other components. It didn’t remain as it was.
Thus, all the components took part in this project, and when we started it, we did that with conviction.
We didn’t start it with the intention: “we need the components for a certain period, then forsake them;” no.

This conviction exists within the Kurdish component. And if we’re going to think with a Kurdish mind, then we can say: If we want to defend Qamishlo, then Deir al-Zor must be defended as well. And Raqqa must be defended as well.

Considering that the residents of these regions have suffered immensely under the terror of ISIS, they have the right to live in freedom as well.
The freedom of the [Syrian people’s] components, can not be bargained with, and can not be used for [political] posturing. The exploitation of rights is considered treason.

We, as Kurds, through our long history, when faced losses was due to the intention of…

– Goodwill..

– Goodwill, but failing to be far-sighted. But peaceful coexistence with others; “brotherhood of peoples” is engraved in their minds.

The notion of bargaining with a certain area, or surrendering it, in return for the recognition of some rights… The basis of the project is not about the rights of one component. And it’s not a matter of cultural and social rights, but a project for a free life.
And a free life includes all Syrians, not only the residents of this region alone, meaning, North-eastern Syria. But it includes the rights of all Syrians.
Thus, when we say that the stability of this region must be preserved, it means that we want to secure democracy for Syria.

The matter of preserving security and stability of this region, and the protection of all the citizens in this region, is what will guarantee that Syria will be democratic. Otherwise Syria will go back to what it was: a centralised Syria; one party running it; policies that were implemented in the past years.

– The Syrian deputy foreign minister, Faysal al-Muqdad, said in a statement, that the negotiations between them and what he called “Kurdish groups” meaning you, of course, goes well and positively… He viewed it with optimism.
Meanwhile, there was a statement attributed to you, saying that the negotiation between you has reached a dead end. Which of you should we believe?

– Naturally, discussions with the public, and during a general meeting with the tribes, the dialogue is basically done in detail. But the reality was not as stated: what I said was taken out of context. It was about one of the stages of negotiations with the government.
As I mentioned earlier, there was hindering in negotiations due to the demands of the regime.
But we still don’t know if there is in fact a change to what the regime demands. We don’t know that.
All that we know, is that there are positive statements that we can take as positive messages on which we could build a new beginning.

Negotiations don’t [necessarily] mean reconciliation.
Often “reconciliation” is mentioned… for example some civilians in Deir al-Zor and other places, went [to the regime] out of fear, not out of free will. They went to the regime out of fear and started reconciliatory processes.
What we’re talking about is not reconciliation, but a formal negotiation process for all of Syria’s fate.

We have a presence here, there is stability, there are administrations, there is a system… all aspects of life are organized here. And we could come to an agreement with this regime for the future of Syria, as a whole. This is our intention.

Thus, on whatever point or aspects we agree, it will be done within the dialogue, the negotiations, which could start in coming days.
The matter of scaremongering… simply due to a statement… some sides promote the narrative of: “The regime is coming! It will kill you, and you’ll have no life. The Kurds will retreat, and you will end up in the clutches of death.”

– Now that we speak of about the negotiations… the SDC always says that there should be a guarantor. And of course that guarantor is Russia.
To what extent do you [SDC] rely on the Russian role in these negotiations?

– The Russian role in Syria is, of course, important. And through our meetings with them, we’ve reminded them of that role. We told them that Russia has a great role in finding a solution; the solution is indeed in Russia’s hands. It can play that role, and we reminded them of that responsibility. And that, out of conviction, not due to short-term tactics. Russia currently has a presence in Syria, and it is the main supporter for the regime’s existence. Therefore, it can open up the way for a solution. It can pressure the regime to start offering solutions. Or, to discuss the existing proposals. Russia has the ability and the will to do so. But that hasn’t happened yet. What we’ve seen is that the Russian government also sought to return all Syrian regions under the authority of the regime, as it is.
It’s true that they have issued some positive statements lately: they too, have said that they’re willing to take the role of a guarantor for this process, and that they encourage the Kurds to start such a process… and so on; such statements.
But these also remain within the statements that are not being implemented. As I mentioned, the Americans’ statements still remain in a theoretical context and not practised. The Russian statements also still remain in a theoretical context. The regime side also have statements that are not implemented on the ground.
Currently there are the Turkish threats every other day: “Manbij will be returned to us” and “The YPG must leave” and such statements.

– I would like to ask… There is a bitter subject between you and the Russians, which is Afrin issue, and the anniversary of the offensive on it is in two days.
The Russians had a big role in what happened. Do you trust the Russians now? Don’t you think that scenario will be repeated, for interests?

– Naturally, powers, be they local or global, always seek its interests. But here applies another rule which must be mentioned. The Russians had a presence in Afrin, meaning west of Euphrates is under Russian influence. This was a de-facto situation; it didn’t happen according to plans. Theses divisions that came into being between the superpowers in Syria; the states that are involved in Syrian affairs.
There are dangers. There is the danger of repeating that scenario. But basically, if the same thing happens in east of Euphrates… I have mentioned at that start that Syria will be in grave danger. Meaning, to merely allow Turkey to enter an inch of east of Euphrates, it means that all of Syria will be under a great threat. By the factions that Turkey brings from Uygur and Uzbekistan and terrorist factions; from al-Qa’ida and other factions that Turkey supports. Consequently all Syrian town will be under a great threat, and Russia will be responsible for that.

Despite that, we think that the matter between us and Russia is not a matter of trust or the lack of it. We see Russia as a superpower which influences the Syrian issue. And has a main role. If it truly wants, it can start taking serious steps towards a solution.

Many were waiting the Idlib issue; where it is going; how to find a solution for it? In truth, the issue is still unsolved. al-Nusra controls wide areas in those regions. Can the Russians, or the regime, coexist with those factions? Or will they leave it to Turkey, as they’ve done before, to sort them out? Which will not happen, because Turkey is not able to sort them out, or unable to withdraw them from those regions. Or it is unwilling to do so.

– Or it will compel them, or train them for it’s own purposes, as it has done before.

– Perhaps. But at the end, Russia has role, and it has the ability to play a main role in a solution for Syrian.

– Let’s go to another matter, which is the “safe zone” that is talked about these days. Even before it was suggested by the American president, Trump… about a safe zone. You have yourselves have more than once requested a no-fly zone or a safe zone, to counter the Turkish threats.
How do you look at this matter now?

– Actually, the region is secure. Meaning, the current conditions in this region… it is considered a safe region. But, when it is assaulted by Turkey, it won’t remain safe. The stability of this region will be in danger. Due to the daily threats on the safety of these regions by Turkey, we, too, requested a safe zone. We requested for at least a mechanism to secure our bonders. That’s why when we were under a serious threat, we chose for the Syrian army to come and protect the border. To what extent that would be a fundamental solution, that too wasn’t clear.
But at least we wanted to halt this [potential] offensive, so that we can move on to the next step, which is the matter of the local administrations; the political solution.

The “safe zone” as Turkey claims: a “safe zone” which it controls, set up civil councils there, and place the military forces in it, won’t be a safe area. It will turn into a region ablaze; conflicts and wars, and ethnic cleansing of the original residents, just as it happened in Afrin.
Turkey calls Afrin “safe,” while it commits ethnic cleansing there. The conditions in this region will become like that [of Afrin]. Therefore, such a suggestion is not acceptable for us.

– I would like for a point to be clarified. The idea was suggested by President Trump, and there was a threat in what he said; he said “we will devastate Turkey economically, if it assaults our allies” and “we will set up a safe zone.”
I mean, why do the Turks think that such a safe zone is for them? That they will control it? That’s my question.

– Turkey always wants to interpret the talk as it wishes.
And suddenly they remembered that they had asked for it years ago, and that the time has come to establish such a safe-zone.
While the venture could be completely different from that. Or, there could be a Turkish-American agreement; we don’t know.

– Also possible?

– We don’t know, it’s possible.
We can always consider several possibilities. There is the danger of an existing Turkish-American agreement. But I think America knows that the mere entrance of Turkey into theses regions, means blowing away all the achievements that have been gained so far. And thus the blame will be on America for the massacres that [will be] committed.

– A few days ago, State Secretary Pompeo said in a statement that the age of American shame is gone. By which he meant: we left regions where massacres and genocides were committed; that era is over, that history will not be repeated… He even called it “the American shame.”

Now they say: we will protect our partners even if we withdraw. Are there clear steps on how they would protect those allies? Or are those just statements and rhetoric?

– They do try to implement the statements on the ground. Of course, with taking our views into consideration. Meaning, what we think, and how to solve this impasse. And how to possibly protect the partners in practice.
We are still in the dialogue phase. In other words: none of those statements have been practically implemented. If that is done, then when can say they are serious and honest about this and that they really want their allies and partners protected from any attack, either from inside our outside.

– Have you, SDC, discussed the matter of this region with the Americans? Have they told you anything? The main points… how it will be.

– No. We always inquire [their] views about Syria. What the view is, what the strategy is, and how they think [about it].

There were several statements by Russian officials, saying that the Americans want to establish a state in this region. A Kurdish state.
Until now there isn’t any attempt or utterance that indicate establishing a state in these regions. All that there is, is that they mentioned that they want the region to remain stable and secure, and that the different peoples to live there in peace and security.
Even in the matter of participating the political process, they didn’t have a clear view. But lately we’ve noticed that they have started working on that. Working on it, meaning that the representatives of these regions must part of the political process.

But until now we don’t see any practical indication that a political process or negotiation will be started, or which sides would participate in it. That picture is not cleared yet either.

– The safe zone is welcomed by you, and you have your views. And it is welcomed by the Turkish state, and of course it has it views. It is rejected by Syria and the Russians as well. Lavrov said that those regions should be under the control of the [Syrian] army.

What do you think of those Russian statements, knowing that you rely on them to be a guarantor in the negotiations?

– Putting this region under the control of the [Syrian] army without a parallel political process, will also not be a guarantee for protecting the region.
We tried to arrange such a procedure fro Afrin, but it didn’t happen. And when it’s said that the border be the responsibility of the Syrian army, means that the existing forces become part of the Syrian army, in return for political process regarding the existing [local] administration. It means, the processes will be concurrence; taking control of the border and the recognition of the existing self-administration.

Until now there are no indications… I don’t want to paint a pessimistic picture, but there are hurdles and difficulties. There are still many points and matters that we must talk about in length, so that the ears get used to hearing some terms. The self-administration; what it is. The ears must get used to it; Democracy; what it is. The ears must get used to it. Next to “decentralization” and “democracy,” and many other terms that has to be talked about in length and repeatedly. So that the ears get used to it, in order to start taking trust-building steps and starting the negotiation process.
That is what we work on, and we have a strategy for that matter.

– There were leaks in the media appeared today, [revealing] some points of discussion; among them: that you are demanded to recognize that the Syrian Arab Republic is the sovereign state, etc.; that the elected president of Syria is Bashar al-Assad; that the petrol and resources must be distributed to all; that the SDF will become part of the Syrian army, and preserving the democratic self-administration in some form. These points are supposedly proposed between you, or that you have proposed it to the Russians. How accurate is that claim?

– I also took a look at those points that were spread in the media, but it’s not our document.

– Not your document.

– Not our document.
We did submit a document to the Russians, and the regime studied it as well. And supposedly, there will be discussions on that document and those points in the coming days. In other words, it will kick off the dialogue phase.
And the points were not as they were published in the media, or leaked to the media. One of the points include the integrity of Syrian territory… the matter of the self-administration, the matter of languages, and the plurality of languages… to the economy and resources.

– And that the Kurdish people is the second largest in Syria… such points?

– There are no such things.
The main points are within a framework of general principles.
It has been proposed, and that it would be discussed in the coming days. Or, negotiate on them in coming days. And we are waiting, we don’t know yet.

– When will be those “coming days”?

– It could be soon or not so soon.

– Isn’t there a an intermediary side between you?

– Russia will be the guarantor between us.