Who supports whom in Syria: a quick guide to understanding the war seven years later

Syria has been immersed in an endless civil war that has bled the country for seven years, caused the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War and has staged the frozen conflict, but latent, between various powers of the West and the Middle East. This weekend, after the bombings of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to the positions of the regime of Bashar-Al Asad, has taken a new, always uncertain direction.

Given that many things have happened since the 2011 revolution resulted in a bloody government repression and, finally, in an armed civil conflict, it may be useful to review the state of affairs in Syria in full 2018. What interests move to each of the actors and who tacitly or directly supports the main protagonists of the war: the Al-Assad government; the amalgam of opposition groups; the Kurdish forces; and the Salafist movements.

Cornered by ISIS and expelled from its former capital, Al-Raqqa, Syria is now more than ever a conflict on which many others are pivoting. And although there are no direct confrontations between Saudi Arabia and Iran or between the countries of NATO and Russia, on the devastated territory of the country there are extensive games of support through which each power places its cards. This is how the supports are distributed in the Syrian complexity.

United States → rebels and Kurds

Sideways, the United States has been supporting rebel factions since the start of the war. Generally through armament. Beyond the original democratic aspirations of the Syrian revolution, today extremely blurred, the United States opted for rebels in opposition to Bashar Al-Asad, strong man of the country until 2011. Al-Asad was close to other similar dictators of socialist profile far from the American orbit.

His two military actions in Syria, in fact, have been merely reactive to Al-Assad's chemical attacks: at no time have they had a real strategic sense to help the opposition, an incomprehensible amalgam of democratic, Islamist and radical groups. Your support today is already marginal. Washington has also sent weapons to the Kurdish rebels (especially during its offensive against ISIS). Their ties are less solid than those that bind Iraqi Kurdistan.

France and the United Kingdom → rebels

The position of Europe has been, as almost always in these situations, defined by the policy of the United States. Former heavyweight in the region, France has had a more aggressive character under both Hollande and now during the presidency of Macron, with bombings to the positions of the Islamic State. In the United Kingdom, Syria remains a controversial issue. In both cases, the lines of support follow the dictates marked by Washington.

Russia → Bashar Al-Assad

Since the beginning of the conflict, Russia has interpreted Syria as a way to settle its lost pre-eminence on the global board. For Vladimir Putin, Bashar Al-Asad is a non-negotiable piece whose fall he is not willing to allow. Hence the Kremlin's extraordinary involvement in the war, either through systematic bombing of the opposition or by offering logistical support from Latakia, the main port of Syria to the Mediterranean.

In Syria, Russia plays more than a mere geopolitical victory in the short term: its ability to influence international politics is at stake. And hence the threats of reprisals after the US bombings.

Iran → Bashar Al-Assad

Iran plays in its own space, although for different reasons. Not only do religious factors operate (Al-Asad is Alawite, a liturgical branch of Shia Islam, whose bastion of international prowess is the Ayatollah regime), but also strategic: Syria was one of the few states in the Middle East not openly confronted Iran, thanks to its secular nature and natural aloofness of Saudi Arabia. His support to Al-Assad seeks to ensure an ally and a focus of influence in the region, both at a political and strategic level (through a fixed military presence in the area).

Saudi Arabia → rebels

Especially if we take into account that, for Saudi Arabia, Al-Asad is a piece to be charged. Like Russia and the United States, Iran and the Saudi monarchy use Syria as a way to dispute the influence in the Middle East: the defeat of one implies the victory of the other. Saudi Arabia actively finances various opposition groups linked to the most radical Islamism (dynamited ISIS). For Riyadh, the hypothetical fall of Al-Asad represents an opportunity to sow with influence the regime that emerges afterwards.

Israel → Israel

So far, Israel's role in the Syrian conflict had been limited. Until now. The growing influence of Iran and the open (albeit cold) confrontation between the two countries during the last decade has caused their interventions on the ground (in the Golan Heights, which it controls) to have been greater, launching missiles against Iranian drones and climbing the confrontations little by little. Again, Syria can serve as a proxy for the latent conflict between Israel and Iran.

As noted here, it is a disturbing development: neither Russia nor the three Western powers have too many incentives to take hostilities further; Israel and Iran maybe yes.

Turkey → enemies of the Kurds

The loose anti-Syrian verse of Syria: a member of NATO, the Turkish support line, a priori, should be the same as that of the United States and its allies. It is more complex: although nominally Erdogan does support the Syrian opposition, his only real concern is the Kurdish rebels. It has undertaken active military campaigns against Syrian forces both on its border and inside the Syrian terrain, eventually taking cities controlled by Kurds like Afrin.

Turkey will support anyone who confronts the Kurds. That is why it has clashed little with Russia, despite the demolition of one of its planes by another Turkish three years ago. And that is why it maintains a very different profile within the conflict: anything, except the YPG. Although his hard position has involved him colliding with the United States more than once.