Stratfor's Analysis of The U.S. & North Korea Standoff

Homing in on North Korea: An emerging nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula will rise to the top of the United States' agenda this quarter, reducing the priority of less pressing issues as Washington works furiously to avoid — and prepare for — the worst. Thoroughly distracted, the United States will have little time and few resources to spend on other foreign policy matters, including its nuclear deal with Iran. Though Washington will try to counter Tehran's regional power grabs where it can, it will not risk triggering another diplomatic meltdown by abandoning the agreement. The White House will similarly shelve the most aggressive moves in its protectionist trade agenda until next year.

The United States will head into the last quarter of the year facing one of the greatest direct nuclear threats to the American mainland since the Cuban missile crisis. Over the past three months, North Korea has stepped up its nuclear and ballistic missile tests, leading U.S. intelligence officials to conclude that Pyongyang will obtain a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead before next year is out.

Washington will race against the clock to find ways to stall North Korea's progress and bring it back to the negotiating table. The United States will likely try to court the support of Russia and China in this endeavor as it doubles down on employing diplomatic and financial pressure to dissuade further weapons tests by Pyongyang. But getting their help will not be easy. Even if the United States casts a wider sanctions net to include Russian and Chinese firms that trade with or provide financial services to North Korea, it will not weaken either country's determination to protect the stability of the government in Pyongyang while advocating a policy of engagement rather than isolation.

But therein lies the problem.

Dialogue between North Korea and the United States presents somewhat of a Gordian knot. Pyongyang will agree to talk with Washington only as an equal, and it will not curb its weapons development to do so. Pyongyang is also willing to accept the risk of further sanctions, confident that its troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and its burgeoning nuclear capabilities would preclude any military action against it. Washington, on the other hand, has demanded that Pyongyang freeze its nuclear weapons tests before talks can begin. Washington also views coercion as the most effective method of blocking Pyongyang's continued weapons development. Because the two adversaries' positions are incompatible, their dispute will doubtless escalate in the coming quarter.

As North Korea continues to conduct weapons tests, the risk of U.S. military action against it will rise. Though the United States could launch a limited strike against North Korea with the assets it currently has near the peninsula, Washington is far more likely to gradually build up its military presence in the region throughout the quarter, giving diplomatic overtures and sanctions a chance to take effect. And though an accident or close call during a North Korean missile launch may force the United States or its allies to shoot down the device, they will not make the decision to initiate a more serious military intervention before the end of the year.