RE: Fact: Steemit Sybil Attacked the Steem Blockchain
I have engaged with you in the past about this specific threat. ~Two years ago you and other consensus witnesses did not act to prevent this threat when I came to understand and discuss it. The responses I received generally took the form 'We do not agree' I got from @timcliff (or @smooth. Maybe you. Memory fails me atm).
Here we are. While that is in the past, I reckon it is important to acknowledge our failures and limitations in order to move forward based on real and factual data.
I don't care about acknowledgment, and am not here to say 'I told you so', but I do want to pierce the veil of nescience regarding foreknowledge. The fact is that during the entire existence of Steem, the founder's stake has been a threat of Sybil attack, and if the threat of majority stake effecting a 51% attack is not utterly eliminated going forward, there is no possibility of Steem being secure from Sybil attacks.
We (the Steem community) may or may not survive this attack. If we do, failing to prevent this vector for Sybil attacks will simply leave Steem as vulnerable to destruction as it has always been. The next thing I want from witnesses, while ongoing attempts to secure the chain continue, is specific proposals to eliminate this threat. You may find it useful to consider my recommendations from our prior discussions in order to reconsider their potential for success, or eliminate them from consideration as lacking potential to resolve the problem.
The witnesses that have been continually in the consensus for these last several years have profited (insofar as witnessing is profitable) from the centralizing multiplication of stake weight the current witness voting mechanism employs. It is difficult to dismiss this fact considering the potential of witnesses to actually secure the blockchain going forward, but since it's an existential matter presently (as far as Steem is concerned) I expect it is necessary and possible.
Starting with 1 Steem = 1 witness vote (or 100% VP depletion without recharge for witness votes), and executing code preventing exchanges from voting on witnesses, how do we secure Steem from this threat?
Thanks!
Are there other high value DPoS chains using 1t1v?
Major stake holders who think 1t1v is the correct way to secure the chain should announce they will only vote for witnesses who will push for this change to be made.
I dunno. I only care about Steem.
While you're right in your next statement, that's about the kind of commitment we have been hearing from Roy Liu regarding powering down the exchanges and withdrawing Tron's puppet witnesses.
Do please differentiate yourself from Roy. I'd like your forthright consideration, not lawyerspeak.
Saying, "I don't know" but advocating for an untested change to be implemented doesn't work. 1t1v may actually be ideal, but until things are really thought through and tested, it could end up being a bad change and the witnesses would again be blamed for moving too quickly or going with changes that haven't been shown to be successful elsewhere.
Maybe EOS will go to 1t1v before Steem, and we'll learn a lot from them. I don't know.
You are the parties, you witnesses, we Steemers have elected to understand and effect necessary governance of the chain.
Please assess the facts and take a position based on your understanding - and not whatever some other chain I have no interest in or governance of does or doesn't do - so that Steem can proceed to deal with novel circumstances that aren't replicated elsewhere.
The math is simple. Make a decision and take a stand, which is what Steem needs from it's governance now. Failing to do this will result in delivery of the chain to it's extant majority stakeholder, as has been made clear. Even implementing 1t1v is not proposed to prevent that stake advantage. All it does make possible is accurately weighting the stake of voters per their holdings. Sun's stake is magnified 30x by 1t30v, and that's the present circumstance.
I think that before pushing for an solution we must examine the problem using a solid game theory model. Else we riak introducing other attack vectors. EDIT: having stake does not equal knowing what is the best solution.
No, but it sure equals the power to ram your favored solution/problem through. Pretty sure that's what @lukestoke's reply meant.
Find a better approach to governance that DPoS stake-weighted voting and it can be seriously explored. I have yet to see one that doesn't have much more serious problems (like China's centrally controlled reputation system). Read Skin in the Game for a deeper understanding for what stake-weight does have some value (but I agree, is far from perfect, especially for those who have skin in the game in other formats outside of token holdings).
Availed of the same grasp of alternate political mechanisms as you discuess, I do not propose any of them. All I am proposing is the equalization of stake undertaking governance of Steem, by eliminating the 30x multiplication of the weight of substantial stake - such as held by Tron now - over governance.
Accurately weighting our skin in the game is all I presently advocate, not replacing it with some other mechanism. It's a simple thing, and confounds potential abusers of the extant system, such as we are demonstrably and existentially threatened by today as a currency and society.