Comparison of the three distinctly different types of pleasure

Immanuel Kant - image soruce

The pleasure and the good have both attitudes to the ability to desire and include within themselves: the first a pathological-conditioned pleasure, the second a purely practical pleasure, which is determined not only by the notion of the object but also by the relation of the subject with the existence of the subject. It likes not only the subject but also his existence. The Judgment of the taste, on the contrary, is purely contemplative, that is a judgment which, indifferent to the existence of the subject, connects its nature only with the feeling of pleasure and discontent. But this contemplation itself is also not a concept; because the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither theoretical nor practical) and is therefore neither concept-based nor conceptually oriented.

The pleasant, the beautiful, the good means three different relations of the ideas to the feeling of pleasure and discontent, in terms of which we distinguish one of the other objects or types of ideas. Also the corresponding to each sense of expression, which means satisfaction in them, are not the same. Pleasant is called for someone who satisfies him; beautiful-he only likes; good- valued, approved, in which it imposes objective value. Pleasure also applies to animals without sense; beauty - only for human beings; animal, yet intelligent beings, but also not only as such but also as animal; But goodness applies to every reasonable being at all; a situation that can get its full justification and explanation only in what follows. It can be said that of all these three types of pleasure, only the taste of the beautiful is uninterested and free pleasure; because no interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, does not require forgiveness. Therefore, for the pleasure, it could be said that the three mentioned cases refer to tendency or favor or respect. For grace is the only free pleasure. The object of the tendency and an object imposed on the desire of a law of reason do not leave us the freedom to make ourselves something of pleasure for us. Every interest is a necessity or arouses it; and as a definite basis for approval, no longer allows the judgment on the subject to be free.

Regarding the interest of the pleasure, everybody says that hunger is the best chef and that for people with healthy appetite everything is delicious that can be eaten; so one such pleasure does not prove a choice of taste. Only when the need is satisfied can one find out which one tastes and what does not. There is also morality (behavior) without virtue, courtesy without goodwill, decency without integrity, and so on. Because where the moral law speaks, there is no objectively free choice about what needs to be done; and to show a taste in his or her own behavior (or in the judgment of others) is something else than expressing his moral way of thinking: for it contains a commandment and generates a need, whereas, on the contrary, the moral taste only plays with the objects of pleasure without being bound by anybody. Taste is the ability to judge an object or a way of presentation by pleasure or discontent without any interest. The subject of such pleasure is called beautiful.