"How Mao Learned To Love The Bomb" (My Own Research Paper)

Hi guys,

I will paste one of my research papers I wrote during my Master degree in 2008, it's still valid though. Feel free to review and give comments. Hope you find it interesting.

Nuclear Weapons In The People's Republic Of China

China is a nuclear power since 1964 and was the fifth nation to develop the atom bomb after the United States. However, it is estimated to posses only the smallest nuclear arsenal of the five major nuclear-weapon states. This essay focuses on the Peoples Republic of China´s (PRC) policies and doctrines towards nuclear weapons. Further, it tries to explain the underlying motives behind that decision. The first part of this essay will be a run up of the events that made China develop the atom bomb, it will also try to shed light on the mindset and strategic mechanism that lead to that choice.

"How Mao Learned To Love The Bomb"

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 and at that time the Chinese communists commanded one of the world’s largest land armies of about 5 million soldiers. Surprisingly, when the first atomic bomb was detonated over Hiroshima in 1945, Mao was initially not very impressed. He asserted that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger, used by the US reactionaries to scare people" and that “the outcome of wars is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon”. This clearly can be seen as a result of his experiences during the Japanese Resistance War, where he achieved major victories through mass mobilization and guerrilla warfare. He firmly believed that “millet plus rifles” is more effective than “planes and tanks” and that one can win over a technological superior enemy when entangling him in a war of attrition. Some historians believe that Mao failed to grasp the more far-reaching consequences of nuclear weapons and their distinct nature from conventional weapons. During a talk with Prime Minister Nehru he remarked that the only difference between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons lies in their scope of damage. From this we can conclude that during the early years of the People’s Republic Mao had no aspirations to develop nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

However, the experiences China made during the Korean War (1950-1953) and the great causalities it suffered led her military leaders to reevaluate their sole focus on “man over machine” and neglect of advanced military technology, even though they continued to uphold the language of fighting a “People’s War”. In many ways, the events of the Korean War and the Korean Armistice in 1953 were crucial for the nascent Chinese State and its quest for the atomic bomb. For the Chinese, the armistice was seen as the first equal treaty signed with the West – a great victory after the Opium War’s notoriously humiliating Unequal Treaties. The campaign in Korea unleashed a fresh wave of nationalistic fervour and spawned a determination to create a different, stronger “New China”. On top of that, the spectre of an American nuclear war on China was underscored by President Truman’s comment that in the Korean War “the US might use any weapon in its arsenal” as well as signs that the US planned an alliance with the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-sheck. Even more radical was General MacArthur’s plan to lay down “fields of suitable radio-active materials” to keep the Chinese off the Korean Peninsula for the next centuries. These threats, combined with the tough lessons learned in the war, made it clear for China that to survive it would need to obtain advanced military technology and, preferable, nuclear weapons of its own. As such, the Korean War set the foundations for Sino-Soviet military assistance. The Soviets subsequently generously supplied China with their latest conventional weapon designs, and later also with nuclear know-how.

In International Relations theory the neorealist school of thought claims that because of the enormous destructive capacity of nuclear weapons a state that is threatened by nuclear weapons automatically will try to find a deterrent. If it can afford to by developing its own nuclear capacity, or if it cannot, then by joining an alliance with a nuclear power as a means of extended deterrence. With this in mind, it was a logical step for China to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in 1950 and in turn benefit from its nuclear umbrella. However, China’s security was ensured only for a brief period. President Eisenhower’s introduction of a policy of “massive retaliation” in 1954, which determines that upon a conventional attack a nuclear retaliation must follow, put serious doubts on how far the Soviet “big brother” would support China if facing total annihilation as a consequence. Besides this, it also offset the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) quantitative superiority. The situation became even direr for China when a Mutual Defence Treaty was signed between the US and the Chinese Nationalists in December 1954, shortly followed by the First and Second Taiwan Crisis, which again lead to nuclear threats with the US Secretary of State saying that the American people have to be prepared for possible nuclear strikes against China.

These events illustrated that China's foreign policies would be subject to major constraints as long as the Chinese lacked adequate means of their own for deterring nuclear threats and also that the Soviet nuclear umbrella could not be relied on. Nevertheless, to regard this as the one and only reason for China to establish its own nuclear program might be a bit too narrow. First of all we should remember that during the 1960s the possession of the atomic bomb had an important symbolic function, as it enhanced the state’s international prestige and even might defined it as a “modern” state. In political theory this falls under the constructivist school, which focuses on the influence of ideas and norms on states. In a meeting with a delegation of the Algerian government in 1960, Mao said that the reason the French look down upon them is that they only can see money, steel, and atom bombs. This means that possessing those three features is crucial for one state’s prestige and that the atom bomb can – besides military hard power – also bestow soft power and influence. During this period, a notion of joining the “nuclear club” was a common reference, often combined with a belief that the mastery of nuclear power was directly linked to a states position in the international hierarchy. In this sense the function of the atom bomb can be compared with later space programs, such as the Apollo Missions (1963 - 1972). While the United States and Soviet Union engaged in a race to the moon, the scientific exploits were marginal and the costs incredibly high, but the propaganda effect still made it worth. It is hard to explain this phenomenon with realist theory only, as it was a race for prestige and legitimacy between the two competing ideological systems. Moreover, during the so-called “Atomic Age” the negative connotations that are connected with nuclear weapons nowadays were not yet established. In general, nuclear bombs and power were seen as a sign of progress even to a Utopian degree. In 1964, President Kennedy approved a feasibility study on excavating a second Panama Canal using nuclear explosions. The consciousness on the dangers of radiation and the possible contamination of territory for hundreds of years was apparently not very developed yet.

The PRC started its own Nuclear Weapon Program in 1955, with help from the Soviet Union through an agreement on new technology for national defence signed in 1957. However, Sino-Soviet relations had already begun to deteriorate in 1956. Especially the relationship between Krushchev and Mao was strained after Krushchev’s “Secret Speech” in which he denounced Stalin. In a speech on 18 November 1957, Mao stated that in event of an atomic war where half the population of the world was killed, China would still come out relatively well. This kind of nuclear brinkmanship upset the Soviets and as a consequence they abrogated the national defence technology agreement. Later in 1960, the Soviets completely withdrew their military advisors and abolished large portions of arrangements for economic and military cooperation. With the Soviet nuclear umbrella removed China was now completely set on her own.

Despite struggling through the devastating Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and only possessing limited industrial and scientific resources China detonated her first atomic bomb in 1964, which is an impressive achievement for a country struck by turmoil and poverty. Three years later, the PRC detonated its first hydrogen bomb.