Descartes' Meditations: A Dialogue "How to be institutionalised"

How To Be Institutionalised:
A dialogue about… something (not nothing).

“And let him deceive me as much as he wishes,
he will still never bring it about that I am nothing
as long as I think I am something.”

A busy doctor’s surgery waiting room, patients have been waiting a while. Gene has struck up a conversation with another patient, who is grumpy, and so shall be called HoHum, and HoHum’s friend, Mea.

HoHum. So, you didn’t think anything was real? Are we talking solipsism? Because I can get behind that. But I wouldn’t actually act on it, or I’d end up in this place for good.

Gene. It was dark times. I didn’t even know if I existed. Nothing was immune to doubt. If I couldn’t guarantee I wasn’t dreaming, or in the Matrix, how could anything I experience or think be real?

Mea. Dreaming? You’re in a doctor’s waiting room. What a boring choice of location for a dream.

HoHum. (aside) Mea, shh. I feel like we don’t want to get this guy started on dreaming.

Gene. (continuing) But nobody, not even God, or some evil genius demon, will ever be able to bring it about that I am nothing, as long as I think I am something.

Mea. Sounds like the anti-bullying condolence you get shoved down your throat in high school.

Gene. Start here; nothing in the world exists anymore. No sky, sun, waiting room, HoHum or Mea. Everything is gone! Now, am I gone? Do I not exist? But aha! The second I doubt my own existence, I exist. I have doubted; a kind of thought. I think, therefore I exist.

Across the room two maintenance men are trying to shift a vending machine. One says to the other, “Archie, just because you’ve jacked one corner doesn’t mean you can move the whole bloody thing!”

Gene. Like that! If I could find one certain, unmovable point, everything would be uphill from there. And I did.

HoHum. Um, I don’t think you did.

Gene looks mildly offended. HoHum continues.

HoHum. By “nothing”, you mean non-existent. And by “something”, you mean existent, right? The “thing” part; I’ll deal with that later. You’re saying that with the word “think” alone - that one act - you are pulled from this mysterious, whirlpool of an abyss into existence?

Mea. It sounds reasonable enough. I already assumed and believed I existed. Always had. And his premise makes sense; I think all the time. I think therefore I am.

HoHum. But you can’t accept an argument, and its one premise, just because you already accept the conclusion, Mea. It’s question begging. What makes you assume thinking constitutes existing? Either Gene says the same thing again but includes the premise “anything which thinks, exists”, a premise with which you might not even agree. Or, he changes his argument to “I think therefore there are thoughts,” in which case one’s existence remains dubious. Also, the word “I” appears in both your premise and conclusion, meaning you have pre-supposed the existence of “I” before your conclusion is even stated.

Gene. But, er, it’s not even an argument at all. It is self-fulfilling, it has performative consistency. Every act of thought is self-verifying. Likewise, to think “I doubt that I am thinking” is self-contradictory.

Mea. Excuse yourself of all necessity of argument, why don’t you. Convenient.

Gene. The “I” is also important. I exist, because I can guarantee my own thoughts. Can’t speak for you guys existing. Could be robots.

Hobbes. So if you want to remain steadfast with the one premise “I think”, where did the knowledge that you have ever thought come from? Thinking is an act, and you can’t grasp any act without its subject. By assuming there is thought, you guarantee yourself a thinker; an exister. But you have not explained the source of the knowledge that there is thought.

Gene. I never said the thinking thing was physical! The subject of the action may be a substance, or even “matter”, but that doesn’t mean it is a body.

Mea. Body and matter are different now? This is new. Great.

Gene. But... wax…

Mea. Please, no. Now I’m not even sure about “I think therefore I am”. Don’t get upset, you’ve just been too successful. You decide to dig yourself a skeptical hole, and then realized there is no ladder down there, and you didn’t let yourself bring one, because you insisted “there are no senses blah blah blah”.

HoHum. Personally, I don’t think it’s possible to reject all senses and experiences like you say you do, Gene. You can’t avoid perception. You run into light, shade, cold, hot, love, hate. If you truly discarded all of these, your being – mind, body, the functions of both – would just be annihilated. Nothing.

Gene. All I’ve said so far is I am a thinking thing. Something that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also senses and has mental images.

HoHum. Uh, I think you just reinforced my objection.

Gene. Huh. But it just seems to make sense. I think therefore I am. It’s innate. An axiom.

Mea. Skeptics can’t use axioms.

Gene. Shit.

Mea. You mention an evil deceiver. I reckon an evil deceiver doesn’t win when he plants false thoughts in your mind, but when he has also planted the doubts about those thoughts. They are not yours, they are not original. In the same way you can never imagine a 4D world having only the ability to imagine the 3D, you cannot possibly conceive just how convoluted the genius’ deception is. More than that, defeating the evil demon and proving that you’re “something” might not even be an option. If he wanted to make you nothing he would not attempt to deceive you in the first place. If you were nothing, he wouldn’t bother. Therefore, if you are something, as you insist, of course he deceives you.
Oh crap. I don’t know whose side that supported.

Gene. Look. I think therefore I am.

HoHum. No, you can’t -

Mea. All right! Enough! I think I know that I exist to the extent that it is necessary for me to functionally exist. Okay?

The doctor appears in the waiting room.

Doctor. Satre? I’ll see you now.

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Bibliography

Descartes, R. (1998). Second Meditation. In R. Descartes, & D. M. Clarke (Ed.), Meditations and Other Philosphical Writings (D. M. Clarke, Trans., pp. 23-30). London: Penguin Classics.
Descartes, R. (1998). Third Objections, Reply. In R. Descartes, & D. M. Clarke (Ed.), Meditations and Other Philsophical Writings (D. M. Clarke, Trans., pp. 88-89). London: Penguin Classics.
Hobbes, T. (1998). Third Objections. In R. Descartes, & D. M. Clarke (Ed.), Meditations and Other Philsophical Writings (D. M. Clarke, Trans., pp. 87-89). London: Penguin Classics.
Hume, D. (1739). Book 1: Of the Understanding, Section VI: Of Personal Identity. In D. Hume, & E. C. Mossner (Ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature (pp. 299-311). London: Penguin Classics.
Stanford University. (2014). Descartes' Epistemology, 4. Cogito Ergo Sum, 4.1 The First Item of Knowledge. Retrieved September 2015, from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#4