The Subjective Character Experience of Consciousness

The mind-body problem is a struggle and debate between philosophers to account for the relationship the mind has to the body, if any at all. In his paper, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Thomas Nagel addresses this hard problem of the mind-body dilemma by focusing on consciousness. The question is whether mental states, e.g., conscious mental states, could be reduced to physical or chemical states with the current conceptual apparatus or structure of our cognitive ability to understand the physical nature of mental states. However, D.M. Armstrong, an advocate for physicalism, attempts to reduce mental states to physical brain states in hopes to explain mental states in a physical manner. Nagel explains such a reduction needs to account for the subjective character experience of mental states, which is what it is like to be conscious for a subject. In this paper, I will argue against D.M. Armstrong, a strong proponent of physicalism, in order to explain why Nagel believes our current conceptual apparatus does not help us reduce or explain the physical nature of mental states. Furthermore, I will argue against the possibility of closing the gap.

Armstrong’s Type-Identity Theory
Armstrong is an example of a philosopher that relies on the notion of reduction in his theory of mental states. He attempts to argue that mental states could be explained purely in “physic-chemical account of the man’s body” (Pg. 81). He wants to be compatible with the laws of physics and offers his type-identity theory which holds that mental states are brain states. According to a reductionist, a mental state would be some brain state, such as pain would be the c-fibers firing or consciousness is just some neural mechanism in the brain. Armstrong wants his reduction of mental states be something like water is h20. Another example of a successful reduction would be something like lightning is electromagnetism. The reductionists are looking for something that is necessarily physical or chemical property of the actual world.

The Subjective Character Experience of Mental States
Nagel explains that the physicalist lack the ability to explain the physical nature of mental states, because the subjective character experience cannot be reduced. Nagel states, “[A]n organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism––something it is like for the organism” (Pg. 219). Conscious experience is a phenomenon that occurs in a wide variety of animal life, including mammals, amphibians, and reptiles The reason Armstrong and other physicalists are missing the explanation of conscious experience is because the physicalists are attempting to explain consciousness from a third person viewpoint. As opposed to what it is actually like to be conscious for a particular subject. There is an essential part to consciousness which is the subjective character experience. The subjective character experience is what it is like to be that organism. The subjective character experience is “not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing” (Nagel Pg.219). Nagel’s criticism of the physicalist is that any reductionist program that is attempting to reduce mental states to physical states must include the subjective character or else the analysis of the reductionist program is false.
Nagel uses an example of a bat to illustrate his point, that we cannot know the subjective experience of mental phenomena. He chooses a bat, because there sensory apparatus is quite different from us and the point he wants to make will be exceptionally vivid in this particular example. Nagel states that most bats perceive the external world though sonar. Human sensory perception is quite different from the bat’s sonar perception, so we do not have any reasons to believe that the bat’s sonar perception is like our perception. Nagel’s point is that we cannot know what it is like to experience subjectively the bat’s sonar perception. Any attempt to extrapolate bat experience, would also be incomplete because humans cannot know the subjective character of a bat. Nagel claims, the best we can do is form a “schematic conceptions of what it is like” to be a bat (Nagel Pg. 221). Our imagination has limits in attempting to come up with some sort of conception of what it would be like to be a bat. We are limited because we generalize on certain types of experience based on the behavior and the structure of the bat. However, even if we knew the internal and external features of a bat we would still not be able to know what it is like to be a bat! Furthermore, each aspect of bat life that we attempt to explain, still excludes the consciousness of the bat itself. Nagel states that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, but in each of those experiences there is a specific subjective character, which is beyond our ability to conceive that experience. In other words, we cannot account for the subjective character experience, in various elements of bat life, because we cannot experience like a bat.
Nagel claims that the problem of subjective character experience can be applied to humans as well. He uses an example of people born blind and people born deaf. The blind and deaf person would certainly have a subjective experience different from that of a not blind and a non-deaf person. The blind and deaf peoples’ subjective character experiences can be schematically conceptualized by a non-blind and non-deaf person, but never really produce an understanding of “what it is like,” to be blind and deaf. Nagel thinks this because the subjective character does not seem to fit in with the way we conceptualize objects. Subjective experience has a particular point of view that cannot be understood from the third person orientation.

Subjective v. Objective Conception
It is important to note, that Nagel does not claim that physicalism has to be false; rather he claims that physicalism does not include the subjective character experience Nagel claims that physicalism must give a physical account of phenomenological features. However, it seems difficult to accomplish because of subjective character experience. Nagel makes a distinction between two types of conceptions, the subjective and objective conception. The problem is that the physicalist is trying to objectify an experience that is subjective. Nagel states, “facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism–– are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism” (Pg. 222).
We apply the appearance and reality distinction to see how exactly we reduce the appearance of things to the chemical states. This appearance-reality distinction is an identity that is necessary. For example, the appearance of water necessarily equals to h20 in reality. The appearance of lightning is electromagnetism. What is pain or consciousness? According to Nagel, mental states are what they appear to be, such that there is no appearance-reality distinction.
Physical reductionist theories are problematic because of our ability to understand experiences. The viewpoint is critical for understanding an experience. When phenomenon is observed, the viewer is either employing the third person point of view, or the first person point of view. The first person point of view would require the use of a sensual apparatus and the relation of the observed phenomenon to a perception. The third person view attempts to describe an observation, in terms of conceptual schemes based on general properties. Nagel makes the point that we describe our objective point of view “not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses” (Nagel pg. 222). I can imagine what another human being is experiencing, but that will not tell me what it is like for that person experiencing a certain mental state. The subjective character experience cannot be represented through schematic conceptions. When we ask “What it is like to be a bat?” we are addressing a particular point of view. The physicalist requires the reduction of mental states to physical states; however, that cannot be completely understood because the subjective character is not conceptual. Before the physicalist attempt to explain the subjective character experience objectively they should contemplate on the general problem of subjectivity and objectivity.

Explanatory Gap That Cannot Be Bridged With Our Current Resources
The distinction between something subjective being explained objectively is quite problematic. Nagel claims, “it seems unlikely that any physicalist theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind body question without sidestepping it” (Nagel Pg. 225). Nagel concludes, that physicalism is incomprehensible at this time, because the lack of theoretical background. Physicalism tries to explain mental states as equivalent to physical or chemical brain states. However, Nagel’s argument about the subjective character experience, being excluded because of a third person point of view, exposes a problem for physicalism. Physicalism cannot account for the subjective character experience of different species, because all physical states lack this subjective character. As a result, physical theories about the mind cannot be investigated until the problem between subjectivity and objectivity is rendered.

In conclusion, I believe that our human understanding of the structures and likes of our brains has come to a real theoretical problem. The subjective character experience proposed by Nagel has put a dent in understanding mental states as physical states. Further, I believe that we have come to understand the difference between subjectivity and objectivity, so I do not see any way of closing this gap. Our understanding of the subjective character experience cannot be objective with our current conceptual apparatus. Nagel does not endorse any view on the closing the gap, but his hint at leaving the possibility of solving this problem open is not sufficient, because closing the gap requires some mutant ability to transfer your conscious mind into another being and then back to your own mind, to understand how that being experience some mental state. This mutant ability seems unreasonable in the actual world, thus I do not believe we can access someone else’s subjective character experience or even understand it with our current conceptual apparatus.