(Korean War History) Post #2 The Division of Korea, 1945-1948

by Dr. Kathryn Weathersby

Before the Soviet, American, and British allies met at Stalin’s Crimean vacation home in Yalta in February 1945 to plan the postwar settlements, the US and UK wanted to find out what gains the Soviet leader would require in exchange for entering the war against Japan. Stalin rather modestly stated that his goal was to regain the territories Russia had lost to Japan after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. This would mean return of Southern Sakhalin Island, at least the northernmost of the Kurile islands that run north from Hokkaido, and the railroads and ports Russia built in Manchuria in the 1890s. The Soviet leader made no demands regarding Korea, even though he was clearly aware of the strategic importance of the peninsula as a springboard for a Japanese invasion or as a buffer against such an attack.

The historical record is not clear on this point, but it appears that historical precedent was the reason for Stalin’s reticence. Before the war of 1904, Russia had sought influence in Korea rather than outright control. It had gained access to useful parts of Korean territory, through its lease of Jinhae naval base, and to valuable mineral resources through mining concessions. Moreover, Russian influence at King Kojong’s court had helped the Tsar’s government maintain a balance of power on the peninsula, preventing any rival power from gaining complete control.

Therefore, when Roosevelt presented his trusteeship idea to Stalin, the Soviet leader may have seen the arrangement as a way to return to Russia’s pre-1905 strategy. In any case, Stalin did not object to the plan. He asked only how long the trusteeship would last and whether the US intended to station troops in Korea. It should be noted that this discussion on trusteeship for Korea took place only in a private bilateral meeting. The president did not raise the idea in an open meeting of the conference because British Prime Minister Winston Churchill vehemently objected to the concept, fearing that the Americans intended to place under trusteeship British territories that would be liberated after the war, rather than restoring them to the British Imperial rule.

Allied leaders next met in July, in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam. Since Germany had surrendered in May, many territorial issues in Europe remained to be resolved. For the Americans and the Soviets, however, plans for Soviet entry into the war against Japan were particularly important. At Yalta, Stalin had promised that he would enter the war in the East three months after Germany was defeated. The invasion would therefore begin the following month, and the American and Soviet military commands needed to work out terms of cooperation.

Soviet Chief of Staff General Aleksei Antonov began the discussion at Potsdam by deferring to the Americans, who were bearing the brunt of the war against Japan as the Soviet had done in the war against Germany. Antonov respectfully asked whether the US planned to conduct operations against the Korean coast while the Red Army advanced on the ground. The US Chiefs of Staff had in fact discussed such a possibility but had concluded that American forces could land in Korea only after they had secured control of the Japanese home islands. US Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall explained to Antonov that the US did not plan to conduct amphibious operations in Korea because their ships would be exposed to Japanese suicide attacks. Moreover, all available assault ships were needed for anticipated landings on Kyushu. Anticipating that the war would continue for many months, Marshall stated that the US would consider making an attack on Korea after it had established control of Kyushu, at which time American planes could cover the peninsula from airfields on the southernmost Japanese island. He did agree, however, that as soon as the Red Army began its assault, US Air Force and Navy would destroy fuel supply and communications lines in Korea, as well as Japanese aircraft and naval vessels located there.

Whenever the issue arises of why Korea was divided, most people confidently assert that the Soviets and Americans made an agreement to do so at the Potsdam Conference. We can see, however, that at that stage in this fateful course of events, the only agreement the allies made concerned which military forces would be responsible for defeating Japanese troops on the peninsula. Soviet and American military leaders decided without contention that Red Army ground troops would play the major role, while American air and naval forces would provide assistance. In the next post, we will examine how political concerns regarding Korea moved to the forefront in Washington as the war came to an unexpectedly quick end soon after the meeting in Potsdam.