The Ether Fork: A Case Study in Arbitration

Let’s first like to address the romantic nature of this problem.
I like to relate it to the legend of Icarus.

Essentially the market decided to fund untested code, and the market slugged investors in the face for this decision. To put it out there I am indifferent to either option, either to fork the protocol or to let the “attacker” take his bounty. Essentially, a 40mm bounty has been claimed. Ethereum will recover and become stronger because of this event. The DAO itself is dead, which in my mind again is romantic as the first significantly funded DAO venture fund (which named itself DAO after the archetype of which it is itself) will crash and burn, wings melted for flying to close to the sun.

That out of the way, this is a great case study for the future of arbitration in the blockchain world. Some say that by utilizing a fork we are foiling a bank robber, which may be true. But the nature of the ethereum protocol is that it will grow and develop like an amoeba, wherein the miners and exchanges are the consortium that will decide the future of the protocol.

If opted into a fork, ethereum will exist in two different forms, the miners/exchanges who have opted in, and the ones who have not. Overtime, it is in the best interest of the consortium to adopt the most popular/liquid chain. The consortium will choose their own adventure, and users have the option to support one over the other. Whichever decision holds the most popular adoption, will eventually triumph and the less adopted will sizzle out.

I imagine it in my mind as Pacman choosing one path, whereas the dots are proportional to the size of the market. The market will determine a path, and the ones who are wrong will lose, this is basic economics.

Now this idea sprawled in my mind this morning while running around the neighborhood. Being pro-union what if the miners colluded to choose one path over the other, not allowing the option for the other path. Thus circumnavigating the ideals of decentralization at the foundation layer. I am no ethereum expert, their maybe technical structures in place to thwart this, however I see this as a potential qualm that may arise. I do not hold the solution, I have no ideas right now what is correct.

On one hand, I like the idea of a union of exchanges/miners driving the direction of ethereum. If this union holds the morals which resonate with me, then okay I think that the future direction of ethereum will stand tall to those morals and choose the fork that best suites the platform. On the other hand, isn’t that what decentralized networks were built to fight in the first place? Okay, I get it, if the union takes a path that does not sit well with the market, that will create opportunities for other unions to compete. Which then leads to ethereum political parties, which I think we are already seeing the seedlings sprouting.

Forgive me for using ideals of the current status quo to explain future theory. But I wanted to put something out there that addresses these ideologies/theories/doctrines/philosophies.

I do not know the correct path we should choose, but this decision has implications we need to address when thinking about the future of decentralized networks and coming new norms.

If you want to continue this discussion let me know in the comments.