Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have defended a model of authoritarian capitalism (call it 'development with the face of a dictator'). But what neither leader seems to have anticipated is that the commercial sectors of Russia and China are becoming political forces in their own right, exerting ever more pressure on policy making.

According to El Tiempo de Colombia, in the last two decades, the Russian and Chinese multinational corporations, many of them full of cash, have become powerful tools of foreign policy for their respective regimes, but once they saw themselves as modernizing forces that would help to open businesses and society equally. With the presence of energy giants such as Gazprom and Rosneft, who promise to bring commercial values ​​to Russia and the newly independent Soviet ex-Soviet, Anatoly Chubais, a key architect of Russia's privatization program, promoted them as the vanguard of a new ' liberal empire. These companies also united the former Soviet republics closer to Russia, so much the better.

Likewise, in China during the presidencies of Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) and Hu Jintao (2003-2013), the increase of banks such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Agricultural Bank of China, and of energy and industry heavy. Companies such as Sinopec, Sinochem and the Railway Construction Corporation of China were considered precursors of modernization. However, nowadays, nobody could confuse these companies with the equivalent of an ExxonMobil or a Microsoft. Since top executives often parachute directly into the boardroom of the top political office, Chinese megacorporations have long represented a merger of companies and the state.

The connection with Venezuela

This dynamic is clearly on display in Venezuela. Through its affiliation with Venezuela's state oil monopoly, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Rosneft has channeled more than 17,000 million dollars in loans to the Chavez regime during the last decade. Meanwhile, Rosneft gained three million tons of oil in 2017 from its operations in Venezuela. In general, Russia has invested in many Venezuelan industries, from banking to bus assembly. At the same time, Venezuela has been one of the largest buyers of Russian weapons among Latin American countries.

Due to these debts and other economic ties, Putin has no choice but to back the breakdown of the Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro's regime, even as public support in Russia decreases to foreign interventions by the Kremlin. Rosneft's interests in Venezuela are simply too deep for him to withdraw, especially now that Western sanctions have paralyzed the company's ability to secure financing in international markets.

Russia's support for Maduro does not reach the same level as its commitments in Syria, where its relationship with the Assad family goes back decades. Rather, his continued commitment in Venezuela reflects a cold and hard business calculation. According to Reuters, private security contractors with close ties to the Kremlin have been sent to defend Maduro. At the same time, there have been unverified (but plausible) reports of Russian planes leaving Venezuela with shipments of gold, as payment for the country's debts. Putin knows that if the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, assumes power, those who supported Maduro will probably be expelled, and Russia's privileged access to Venezuela's oil fields will be revoked.

In monetary terms, the fall of Maduro could mean even greater losses for China, which has investments in Venezuela estimated at around 60,000 million dollars, at least three times more than that of Russia. Like Russia, China slept with the Venezuelan regime in the 2000s, when the country was flourishing with former President Hugo Chávez. While China obtained a much-needed source of oil for its fast-growing economy, Chávez was able to reduce Venezuela's dependence on the United States as one of its main export markets. Meanwhile, Chinese technological giants have helped the Maduro regime in its internal surveillance efforts, and (like Russia) China has sold expensive weapons to Venezuela.

Still, if Maduro falls, China may be less exposed than Russia. The Chinese have been careful to cultivate contacts among various elements of Venezuelan society, including the opposition. And although China still officially supports Maduro, it has not followed Russia accusing the United States of an attempted coup.

This suggests that China wants to avoid the kind of radical steps that Russia is taking. The Kremlin is now actively competing with the USA. UU to influence the course of events in Venezuela, and has described the US attempt. UU to deliver humanitarian aid across the border between Colombia and Venezuela as a ruse to smuggle weapons for the opposition.

China's moderate behavior undoubtedly owes something to its ongoing trade negotiations with the United States. Before extending its deadline to impose higher tariffs on Chinese imports, US President Donald Trump said Huawei and ZTE could be included in a final Chinese-US trade agreement. That would certainly please Xi, whose primary interest is to protect the economic power of both companies.

With the ability to prevent US companies from selling crucial inputs to Chinese companies, the Trump administration could inflict serious damage to both ZTE and Huawei. Huawei is already accused of conspiring to violate US sanctions on Iran, which led to the arrest of its chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, in Canada last December. And ZTE pleaded guilty to similar charges, paying fines of $ 1.4 billion in 2017.

At the end of the day, Venezuela can not hold a candle to the strategic importance of these two companies. And for the Kremlin, the calculation is the same: the prerogatives of the businesses define the national interest. But, perhaps to Putin's annoyance, in Venezuela that calculation has produced the opposite result.

@raquel.ram