Basic determinants of German foreign and security policy

The subject of the research is a certain set of basic determinants of foreign policy decision-making in Germany, as well as the peculiarities of the development of Germany itself, which create the specifics of the country's foreign policy parameters. Particular attention is paid to the transition from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic, when the country's foreign policy dilemma was formed. The aim of the work is to identify the relationship between the factors influencing decision-making in Germany and the characteristics of the economy, geopolitical position, political culture of the country and the personal factor. The research method is theoretical analysis and generalization of scientific literature, periodicals, interviews and statements of prominent political figures, documents and sources on a given topic. The result of the work is proof that the features of the vector of development of the FRG itself, which have developed historically in this way, create the specifics of the parameters of the country's foreign policy. It is shown that during the transition from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic, a dilemma of German foreign policy was formed, the essence of which was the confrontation between two alternative points of view: the possibility and prohibition of the use of military force abroad; and if possible, in what format. It has been proven that Germany's refusal to take part in the Libyan NATO campaign gave it the opportunity to resolve this dilemma in accordance with its own national security "ontology". The main values ​​of the foreign policy of the FRG are determined. The conclusion of the presented work is that the internal political and economic peculiarities of Germany led to the formation of a certain logic of building the foreign policy behavior of the FRG.

The research subject is the set of basic determinants of decision making in foreign policy in Germany and the peculiarities of development of the country, which determine the specificity of the country’s foreign policy parameters. Special attention is given to the transition from the Bonn Republic to the Berlin Republic, when the country’s foreign policy dilemma was formed. The purpose of the research is to detect the correlation between the factors, influencing decision-making process in Germany, and the peculiarities of economics, geopolitics, and political culture of the country and the personal factor. The research method is theoretical analysis and generalization of the scope of scientific works, periodicals, interviews and speeches of prominent politicians, documents and sources on this topic. The author proves that the peculiarities of development of Germany itself, which had historically formed in a definite way, determine the specificity of the country’s foreign policy parameters. The author shows German foreign policy dilemma had formed during the transition from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic. This dilemma consists in the confrontation of two alternative opinions: the possibility (and in what format) and the prohibition of use of military force abroad. The author proves that Germany’s refusal to participate in NATO’s operation in Libya allowed it to resolve this dilemma in accordance with the “ontology” of its own national security. the article defines the key determinants of foreign policy of Germany. The author concludes that the peculiarities of domestic policy and economy of Germany have formed the definite logics of its foreign policy. Keywords: German reunification, security policy, Angela Merkel, EU, political decision-making, Germany, foreign policy, Libyan issue, geopolitical factor, personal factor

After the unification of Germany with all the forces of its political spectrum, great attention was paid to the design, ideology, strategy and development of the country's foreign policy. It was clear to all political forces that the country needed to make up for the lost time set by the era of its division and the Cold War. Foreign policy was the area in which Germany had to actively and loudly declare itself in the international arena. However, if for the “Bonn Republic” such rhetoric boiled down to repeating the political maxim “Weimar never again”, then for the “Berlin Republic” a new thesis was added to the evidence of this norm - “more independence in foreign policy”.
Initially, the exclusively geographical term "Berlin Republic" quickly acquired a political connotation, causing controversy among political circles in Germany. At the time of the unification, a coalition government of Social Democrats and Greens was in power, who liked the content of the new term, while the opposition coalition - Christian Socialists, Christian and Free Democrats strongly opposed it. The main argument of the opponents of the "Berlin Republic" was that the relocation of federal structures to Berlin did not entail fundamental changes in the country's Constitution, and accordingly it makes no sense to use a new term to characterize the old constitutional order. Nevertheless, the time itself demanded that in terms of a number of principles for the implementation of foreign (and domestic) policy, the "Berlin Republic" would be to a certain extent different from its predecessor. The basis of the turn in the foreign policy of the FRG was the task of creating a self-sufficient Germany, which makes a significant contribution to world politics and claims to be a relatively independent player who can criticize and not share the position of the world hegemon. Germany's growing self-confidence was bolstered by its awareness of its economic power in the EU. However, in gaining speed and increasing the volume of changes, the "big" FRG showed great caution, and above all, in the issue of deploying its military force abroad.

After the unification of Germany with all the forces of its political spectrum, great attention was paid to the design, ideology, strategy and development of the country's foreign policy. It was clear to all political forces that the country needed to make up for the lost time set by the era of its division and the Cold War. Foreign policy was the area in which Germany had to actively and loudly declare itself in the international arena. However, if for the “Bonn Republic” such rhetoric boiled down to repeating the political maxim “Weimar never again”, then for the “Berlin Republic” a new thesis was added to the evidence of this norm - “more independence in foreign policy”.
The foreign policy dilemma of the "big" FRG
Both the Bonn and the Berlin republics agreed that Germany (as well as any other country) has its own “ontology” of security - peremptory norms that establish German identity in the field of approaches to ensuring national security and defense. These norms determine the key principles of German foreign policy. However, the interpretation of the purpose of establishing these principles were different and formed a kind of foreign policy dilemma of the FRG. Discussions boiled down to a confrontation between two alternative points of view: a) Germany, due to its historical responsibility, should more actively participate in the settlement of military crises, including with the use of hard force; b) it is Germany's past that requires it to adhere to non-military solutions to international crises and refuse to participate in the deployment of its armed forces abroad. At the same time, no one raised any objections that Germany should be and is a reliable and predictable partner for its allies, and a positive and peace-loving actor in world politics for the international community.
In a speech in October 2010, then German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle outlined the basic principles of German foreign policy, which are still relevant today: it “builds on the continuity of previous decades. It is reliable and predictable, focused on our values ​​and interests, and is the engine of political openness and economic development. In its foreign policy, Germany stands for equality and fair reconciliation of the interests of all countries. "
That is why Germany made the decision to participate in Operation Allied Force in 1999 only after a lengthy, almost six-month internal political discussion, as well as the decision not to participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. All this directly indicates that over the years Since 1990, since the Bonn Republic, the foreign policy dilemma of the FRG of the country has not been resolved. Germany was unable to unequivocally agree on the issue of power, national interests and identity in the field of security and defense. “We cannot know what we want if we do not know who we are. This is true both for foreign policy in general and for the personal preferences of politicians. " Over time, Germany has developed a reputation as a multilateral partner par excellence. This position was different from that of its main allies, and was not clearly formulated and explained by the government of Gerhard Schroeder as a specific feature of German foreign policy.
Such indecision in the field of cooperation with partners in ensuring European security put Germany in a difficult position. The contradictions with the United States over the Iraqi company did not bring serious economic and political dividends to Germany either in the international arena or domestically. A significant part of the population of Germany, concentrated mostly in the western and southern parts of the country, did not support the social and economic policy and the foreign policy line of the SPD-Green coalition. The attempts of the Cabinet of Ministers to improve relations with Moscow and Paris by creating a geopolitical axis "Moscow-Berlin-Paris" led to a certain improvement in relations between the countries, but did not reach such a level of development at which one could seriously talk about close cooperation. The country's desire to increase its importance and independence in making foreign policy decisions, in reality, turned into a number of ambitious measures and projects that left behind ambiguous results. In the German political class, fears began to arise that the specified specificity of foreign policy was perceived extremely ambiguously in the world; fears began to spread that such restraint would negatively affect the future of the country's foreign policy.

The "Libyan question" as a moment of truth for the foreign policy of the FRG under the government of A. Merkel.
Schroeder's foreign policy line set before the government of Angela Merkel, who replaced him in 2005, a number of important tasks that need to be addressed. The population of Germany did not require the government to implement any specific version of the FRG's behavior in the international arena. Citizens delegated this choice to representatives of political parties who were to form an inter-party coalition headed by A. Merkel. In this situation, the basis of Germany's foreign policy was a compromise between the leaders of the CDU-CSU and the SPD, who were interested in maintaining internal party stability more than in the active involvement of the country in activities in the international arena, which could become a bone of contention both within society and within coalition. This compromise was reflected in the new edition of the fundamental foreign policy document of the FRG - the White Paper of 2006. In accordance with it, Germany began to position itself as a strong state that respects the position of its allies and is ready to actively participate in their actions on the international arena when it will be necessary.
The Libyan crisis has shown that changes in the international situation put the German state in front of the need to directly respond to new challenges and make difficult decisions. The European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and NATO may not always be absolute guidelines for Germany. The situation in Libya was not easy, also because the combined forces created to contain “Gaddafi's aggression against his people” experienced great difficulties. The constantly changing strategy of NATO countries has led to a deadlock. The Alliance generals initiated a military intervention without detailed elaboration of the political aspect of this issue. In subsequent events, an adequate foreign policy position of Germany was formed and clearly presented to the world community: Germany is in solidarity with the United States as a whole, but in detail it is pursuing a policy in its own interests.
On March 17, 2011, German Ambassador to the UN Peter Wittig made the following statement: “Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely complex. We have carefully considered the options for the use of military force, its consequences, as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the proposed steps prove to be ineffective, we will see the danger of being drawn into a prolonged military conflict that will affect a wider region. We should not engage in military confrontation based on the optimistic assumption that results will be achieved immediately with a minimum number of casualties. Therefore, Germany decided not to support the military option as stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Moreover, Germany will not contribute to such hostilities. Despite the significant military experience gained in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Germany insisted on its right to evaluate each military operation in the mirror of its own principles and national interests, and not in the mirror of British and French politics. Instead of tacitly approving the "Libyan" resolution, Germany sharply declared its opposition to the deployment of military power. As a result, Germany found itself in opposition to its main allies - France, Great Britain and the United States - and in solidarity with Russia, China, India and Brazil.
The position of the German side was sharply criticized both within NATO and by the German opposition. Political commentators in Germany emphasized that such a "pro-Libyan policy" by Germany and the disunity of NATO provoked by it hampered the resolution of the entire Libyan problem. Gernot Erler, deputy chairman of the SPD faction in the Bundestag, said in an interview with the WDR TV channel that Germany had found itself in isolation due to the "problematic decision" of its government. This thesis directly referred to Germany's courageous decision in 1991 to recognize Croatia and Slovenia before their EU partners (which undermined European unity) and to the decision to oppose the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which undermined transatlantic unity).
On the Libyan issue, Germany's foreign policy found itself in a "rationality trap" dictated by the unresolved foreign policy dilemma: the need to expand its influence, increase its role in resolving various international crises and, at the same time, preserve its right not to take part in operations that do not correspond to its Security "ontologies". Escaping this trap, the country unexpectedly found a way out of the protracted impasse and resolved its foreign policy dilemma.
It can be safely argued that Germany's decision not to participate in the NATO operation in Libya was not the result of a direct interruption of political communication between Berlin, London, Paris and Washington. It was associated with the result of building a certain hierarchy of internal political priorities, mainly due to the situation of the crisis in the eurozone. Domestic considerations solidified the trajectory of German foreign policy. These considerations primarily include the economy, geopolitics, the country's political culture and the personality factor. Taken together, these circumstances reveal the "devil" of the political microcosm of the Merkel government in the aspect of foreign and security policy of the FRG - the preservation of a single European political and economic space corresponding to the national interests of Germany.

Long-term economic calculation
The growing independence of Germany in foreign policy means that it will carry out multinational operations that are only in the zone of its direct national interests dictated by the economy.
The 2008 eurozone crisis, which manifested itself in the form of a strong decline in key economic indicators in most advanced economies, which subsequently grew into a global recession (slowdown) of the economy, polarized the German political elite regarding the issue of choosing a foreign policy line of conduct. At the end of January 2015, Angela Merkel noted that the debt crisis of the eurozone had been brought under control, but still not overcome, and politicians were responsible for the development of the eurozone.
When experts talk about the Eurozone crisis, they are talking about a debt crisis: countries that are “outsiders” of the Eurozone, for example, Greece and Spain, use significant loans to cover their national debt, however, thereby becoming dependent on permanent loans (the main creditor is Germany), and only by increasing the level of public debt, on the one hand, Germany is trying to prevent centrifugal tendencies in the euro area, on the other hand, it insists on austerity policies and makes debtor countries even more dependent on loans by issuing insolvent loans. As a result, strong countries (primarily Germany) become only stronger and more influential, and weak ones - weaker and more dependent on leading creditors. Germany, being the main locomotive of the European economy and creditor, forms the “rules of the game” in the eurozone. At the same time, “the country has no other levers of“ coercion ”to cooperation, except for economic ones. Customers of German companies - countries that buy German goods - do not depend on Germany as a state. They do not even feel that any external forces are forcing them to cooperate with Germany. The instruments created within the EU are the only ones that Germany can use. " Ironically, the more the FRG uses such tools, the more a system is built within the EU that serves the needs of only Germany.
A number of German experts say that the European Union should recognize the inevitability of the inevitable stagnation of the Eurozone and the possible exit of the bankrupt countries from the Eurozone. So, according to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor of Germany Joschka Fischer, Angela Merkel "needs to come to terms with the new reality" regarding the crisis in the eurozone and revise the financial policy within the European Union. “You don't need to be a prophet to predict that the eurozone crisis will eventually blow the German austerity scenario to smithereens,” the politician said.
Professor Patrick Chowanek from Beijing Tsinghua University is critical of Germany. He notes that the basis of the problems of the Eurozone is the constant situation of the trade surplus of the FRG. When the state spends less than it earned. The government generates surplus funds that it uses to provide loans. The trade surplus of one state leads to the fact that it finances the trade deficit of another. In this sense, the crisis phenomena in the eurozone are the product of not external, but internal factors. It is ironic that the most effective solution to the eurozone crisis, if we follow this logic, is Germany's exit from the EU and the revision of the country's credit policy in favor of spending funds on its own territory. According to Chovanek, in the event that credit money flows passed, first of all, within Germany, and were not sent to countries that objectively cannot afford to purchase German goods, then this could help the eurozone to get out of the crisis as quickly as possible.
Germany is facing a difficult task: on the one hand, to curb centrifugal tendencies in the eurozone and take a step back, on the other, to remain the main economic power and a "trendsetter" in the EU's economic policy. It can be argued that in the light of these events, in the face of new challenges and threats, Germany's traditional foreign policy guidelines have become more flexible and adaptable not only to national interests, but also to the interests of the EU. It is another matter that the interests of the EU are increasingly being interpreted by Germany as national. This process of "interconversion" requires the gradual solution of many difficult problems and tasks.

Geopolitical factor
Features of the geopolitical position of Germany significantly affect the process of foreign policy decisions. Based on it, Germany's priorities in the geopolitical aspect can be arranged in the following hierarchy: the United States (NATO), NATO expansion, the policy of containing Russia, leadership in the EU together with France, an alliance with the countries of central Europe, strengthening the European system of balance of power in an alliance of interdependent nation states. Globally, as a member of the EU, Germany pays special attention to the shift of the geopolitical world center from the West to Asia.
“Under Chancellor A. Merkel, the expected strengthening of the Atlantic vector took place and the“ post-Schroeder warming ”of relations between the FRG and the United States began. In the coalition agreement between the CDU / CSU and the SPD, “Atlanticism” took the second place after Europe in foreign policy priorities ”. As for the European project and Germany's place in it, first of all today it suffers from growing fragmentation due to internal geopolitical imbalances in the EU. The geopolitical orientation of the EU is increasingly dominated by an exclusive Euro-Atlantic ideology (“West”), which is largely shared by the FRG and the United States. France is more secondary in this EU drifting towards German-American Europe. This secondary nature was formed due to Germany's position in the center of the European project and its dominance in the economic and institutional issues of the European Union. However, Franco-German relations are the "engine" of the European project. If both countries cannot find a common language, then the EU, as a political project, will not make progress.
The challenge is to overcome the new geopolitical rivalry between France and Germany after the unification and expansion of the European Union to the East and to restore trust between them. France's perception of a shift in the geopolitical center of gravity to the East in favor of the FRG led to countervailing measures taken by France in relation to expansion and priorities of the neighborhood. Relations with France and with other EU partners showed that Germany's strategic culture proved to be quite independent in the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), but less independent in relation to NATO policies.
Containing Russia for the FRG means responding to the challenges of European security and at the same time resetting relations with it, so that Germany would become less suspicious of the creation of traditional rear alliances, which it perceives as an attempt to weaken its dominance in the geopolitical center of Europe. Germany is also using the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the long term for the possible consolidation of the existing balance of power within the EU itself in its favor. In general, it can be argued that the desire to find more opportunities for geopolitical maneuver creates the danger of Germany's underestimation of its existing partners (Russia, first of all) and a more frank accentuation of its foreign policy interests.

Political culture and personal factor
Political culture includes political orientations and behavioral models of policy subjects that are typical for a given society. Political culture can be based on national historical experience, on a national belief system, on ideological priorities. It is important that political culture does not create politics, but significantly influences it. It is not monolithic, but changeable, since it is inscribed in the historical context and functions at the general, group and individual levels.
Taking these considerations into account, it can be argued that the main force in the domestic and foreign policy of modern Germany is civil, not military. The role of the military in the decision-making process is only sketched out in the 2016 White Paper. The political culture of Germany dictates the need to resist any possibility of an aggressive use of military force. Hence, the basis of foreign policy thinking is such principles as security for all, economic interdependence, cultural harmony and mutual respect. German political culture is integrated and democratic, characterized by full agreement on basic liberal and neoliberal values ​​- an autonomous, self-sufficient person as the fundamental “atom” of the human world, his individual freedom and choice. The hegemony of neoliberalism in the country's political discourse leads to the fact that the sphere of autonomous, non-market values ​​increasingly invades the ideology and practice of politics and markets. As a result, relations between the market and non-market spheres, between capitalist and non-capitalist value systems, do not always find an optimal combination in various complex compromises.
Today's generational cohort of German leaders gives preference to neoliberal values, as a result of which the government cannot fully calculate all the consequences of its foreign policy decisions (a textbook example is the “trap” of the Minsk agreements for the government of A. Merkel). Neoliberalism functions as an idea of ​​how the world should be, and politicians often stop considering the differences between fantasy and facts, stop being critical of reality. German politicians believe that it is necessary to exert pressure, reeducate and discipline their counterparties, and by non-violent means that absolutely exclude physical violence, until the desired result is obtained. Their motivating considerations are formulated as a necessary condition for a more confident and active foreign policy, including the regional one. In general, they succeed, although sometimes there are exceptions: saving Greece from leaving the eurozone, they lost the UK.
As for A. Merkel, about whom there are already a huge number of works, Nikolai Haufler spoke well of her, who repeatedly took part in her closed meetings with young activists of the CDU. “When I saw her for the first time, I thought that she understands the political decision-making process better than any politician I know. She is able to process a huge amount of information. I even thought that she was probably bored of communicating with most politicians: she simply surpasses them in intelligence. But at our last meeting, at the end of 2016, when Merkel spoke about migration policy, it seemed to me that she had ceased to be objective, that she was more open to those arguments that play into her hands. Perhaps a filter has appeared around her, consisting of people telling her what she wants to hear. "

The foreign policy dilemma of the FRG, which formed during the formation of the Berlin Republic, found its solution in the course of the Libyan crisis. Clearly articulated basic determinants of foreign policy decision-making, namely: long-term economic calculation, the middle geographical position in Europe between France and Russia, emphasis on the priority of civil force in resolving conflicts of various kinds, self-confidence of the FRG political class as an actor playing by the rules of neoliberalism, and "Moral law" (a reference to which is spelled out, moreover, in the Constitution of the country), - led to the formation of a certain logic of building the foreign policy behavior of the FRG. It is aimed at striking a balance between national security requirements and neoliberal principles of domestic policy. In this regard, three meanings of the key determinants of German foreign policy can be found. Firstly, the protection of the common economic space of the European Union and the eurozone, corresponding to the national economic tasks of Germany. Second, the formation of a “ring of friends” within the EU in order to effectively use its own economic resources, namely the construction of common European political interests within the framework of “European politics” that share the norms and values ​​of European integration. Third, the prolongation of the neighborhood policy with a number of Mediterranean and Balkan countries. Fourth, the containment of Russia as a state that is not inclined to perceive all the values ​​of the European Union directly and without alternative. This approach gives the feeling that Germany is promoting not only its own interests, but first of all care about common European and transatlantic security and prosperity, that is, it provides the socio-political peacekeeping that is so much needed by the world community today.