RE: How Cryptography Changed The Course Of Naval & World History in 1922
Some may argue that he diplomatic maneuvre that gave US and the British Empire advantage over the Empire of Japan resulted in the meteoric rise of Yamaoto and his first strike strategy. Japan, having no longer the capacity to compete with the West due to the treaty, shifted her strategy from attrition to pre-emptive knockout blow.
The impetuous Yamamoto faction overthrew the conservatives and adopted the Pearl Harbor attack plan. Yamamoto was very fond of gambling, and his strategic vision reflect the gambler's tendency. He was unable to entirely purge the conservative faction within the Combined Navy; he was forced to appoint the cautious, conservative Nagumo as the operation chief of the Pearl Harbor attack, resulting in its utter strategic failure.
Interesting background. I read that though Yamamoto was the architect for the attack, he was actually against it for strategic reasons. Supposedly, he was overruled because he was lacking clout in the government.
That is true. Yamamoto, as well as the entire naval officer corp, was against the war with the West. When the Imperial Navy was founded, the Empire based the Navy on British model; the Army was based on first the French, then Prussian/German model. The Navy always had affinity towards Britain and by extension the US, from which countries much of the Naval technology was acquired. Because the Japanese government was run by the Army, the Navy had little influence into Japanese foreign policy.
There is an interesting story regarding Yamamoto and Tojo. Apparently, during a cabinet meeting, Yamamoto kicked Tojo's chair out from under him. The hostility between the Army and the Navy likely caused much of the operational disasters during the Pacific War.
The Pearl Harbor attack was designed with ending the war with one massive strike. It was Japan's Schlieffen plan, but Nagumo, being a cautious man, did not comprehend the purpose of the operation. He withdrew premateurly, fearing loss of his carrier group, not realizing that Yamamoto planned to end the war with this one strike. Yamamoto gambled the war at the risk of his entire carrier group; if the appointed operational chief were the daring Yagamuchi, the Pacific War may have progressed differently.
Interesting anecdote. Tojo put on such a commanding display at Tsushima, it's a shame for the IJN that they didn't try a similarly bold strategy at the onset of hostilities with the US.
In both wars, Japan did seize the initiative with a surprise attack, but they managed to press it forward against Russia.
Oh sorry. I should have been more clear. Tojo was the Prime Minister at the time of the war, prior he had been the leader of the Army; he was not Admiral Tojo of the Sutshima.
Ah, thanks for setting me straight. My mistake for the assumption. I had just gotten done reading about Tojo crossing Russia's T again at Tsushima.