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RE: Eosio.wrap (eosio.sudo) demystified
Thanks for the reply. I agree, if someone was well-coordinated enough for an attack, they would most likely also be ready with signed transactions to do whatever it is they wanted to do (steal people's money, reset account keys, etc)
Could you elaborate a bit more on the better blacklisting solution? I've known the blacklist approach is temporary (and very fragile) and an all-or-nothing approach which doesn't really follow other DPoS 2/3+1 approaches. How would EOSIO.WRAP improve this?
Members of eosdacserver like myself have voiced our concerns, but we did go ahead and approve the proposal to create the account.
We could blacklist by changing their keys to unusable values. The account would be inaccessible to everyone, the action wouldn't require constant vigilance from all producers, and 15/21 producers would be able to execute the action.
Makes sense. Blowing away the keys on an account would definitely nuke it out. I imagine the blockchain world will go crazy the first time this happens. The real question is if we're ready for a truly governed blockchain.
Thanks for the replies.